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Full Idea
Frege rejected the traditional categories as importing psychological and linguistic impurities into logic.
Gist of Idea
Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities
Source
report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 1.2
Book Ref
Rumfitt,Ian: 'The Boundary Stones of Thought' [OUP 2015], p.18
A Reaction
Resisting such impurities is the main motivation for making logic entirely symbolic, but it doesn't follow that the traditional categories have to be dropped.
| 18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
| 18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
| 4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
| 9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
| 4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
| 8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
| 8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
| 8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
| 8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
| 8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |
| 8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |