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Single Idea 18822

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds ]

Full Idea

Leibniz argued that each monad mirrors or expresses every monad with which it is compossible. Hence compossibility is an equivalence relation among monads; possible worlds may then be identified as the corresponding equivalence classes.

Gist of Idea

Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class

Source

report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 6.1

Book Ref

Rumfitt,Ian: 'The Boundary Stones of Thought' [OUP 2015], p.154

A Reaction

[Rumfitt cites Benson Mates 1986:IV.1 for this claim] There is an analogous world of all the human minds that are in communication with one another - something like a 'culture'.

The 32 ideas with the same theme [existence of non-actual possible worlds]:

19402 The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz]
19434 There may be a world where dogs smell their game at a thousand leagues [Leibniz]
15883 Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility [Leibniz, by Harré]
18822 Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class [Leibniz, by Rumfitt]
7837 Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things [Leibniz, by Stewart,M]
14460 If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary [Russell]
5400 In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four [Russell]
23470 Each thing is in a space of possible facts [Wittgenstein]
11183 The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)]
16957 Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett]
14662 Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
4943 Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke]
11984 Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
4899 Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
16429 A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
16397 If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
16399 Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
16398 Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
9669 There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties [Lewis]
7691 The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette]
10266 Why does the 'myth' of possible worlds produce correct modal logic? [Shapiro]
4207 We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe]
19279 What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale]
10983 Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read]
7792 A world has 'access' to a world it generates, which is important in possible worlds semantics [Girle]
5734 Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia]
5742 In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia]
5743 If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia]
5749 Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia]
18745 A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18747 The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
17956 Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter]