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Full Idea
A statement is 'true at a possibility' if, necessarily, things would have been as the statement (actually) says they are, had the possibility obtained.
Gist of Idea
'True at a possibility' means necessarily true if what is said had obtained
Source
Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 6.6)
Book Ref
Rumfitt,Ian: 'The Boundary Stones of Thought' [OUP 2015], p.181
A Reaction
This is deliberately vague about what a 'possibility' is, but it is intended to be more than a property instantiation, and less than a possible world.
Related Idea
Idea 18828 If two possibilities can't share a determiner, they are incompatible [Rumfitt]
| 18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
| 18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
| 18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
| 18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
| 17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
| 10749 | Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker [Oliver] |
| 15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
| 15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
| 18343 | Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami] |
| 18826 | 'True at a possibility' means necessarily true if what is said had obtained [Rumfitt] |