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Full Idea
'Metaphysical' modality is the sort of modality relative to which it is an interesting question whether the laws of nature are necessary or contingent.
Gist of Idea
'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting
Source
Gideon Rosen (The Limits of Contingency [2006], 02)
Book Ref
'Identity and Modality', ed/tr. MacBride,Fraser [OUP 2006], p.16
A Reaction
Being an essentialist here, I take it that the stuff of the universe necessitates the so-called 'laws'. The metaphysically interesting question is whether the stuff might have been different. Search me! A nice test of metaphysical modality though.
| 18849 | Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen] |
| 18850 | 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen] |
| 18848 | Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen] |
| 18851 | Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen] |
| 18852 | A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen] |
| 18853 | A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen] |
| 18854 | The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen] |
| 18855 | Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen] |
| 18858 | Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen] |
| 18857 | Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen] |
| 18856 | Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen] |