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Single Idea 18856

[filed under theme 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity ]

Full Idea

According to the Non-Standard conception of Metaphysical Necessity, P is metaphysically necessary when its negation is logically incompatible with the nature of things.

Gist of Idea

Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things

Source

Gideon Rosen (The Limits of Contingency [2006], 10)

Book Ref

'Identity and Modality', ed/tr. MacBride,Fraser [OUP 2006], p.39

A Reaction

Rosen's new second meaning of the term. My immediate problem is with it resting on being 'logically' incompatible. Are squares 'logically' incompatible with circles? I like the idea that it rests on 'the nature of things'. (Psst! natures = essences)

Related Ideas

Idea 18857 Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]

Idea 18858 Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]

The 29 ideas from Gideon Rosen

8912 Nowadays abstractions are defined as non-spatial, causally inert things [Rosen]
8913 Chess may be abstract, but it has existed in specific space and time [Rosen]
8914 Sets are said to be abstract and non-spatial, but a set of books can be on a shelf [Rosen]
8918 Functional terms can pick out abstractions by asserting an equivalence relation [Rosen]
8919 Abstraction by equivalence relationships might prove that a train is an abstract entity [Rosen]
8917 The Way of Abstraction used to say an abstraction is an idea that was formed by abstracting [Rosen]
8916 Conflating abstractions with either sets or universals is a big claim, needing a big defence [Rosen]
8915 How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things [Rosen]
18849 Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
18850 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
18848 Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen]
18852 A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
18851 Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen]
18853 A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
18854 The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen]
18855 Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen]
18857 Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
18856 Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
18858 Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
14092 Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen]
14093 An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen]
14094 The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen]
14095 Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen]
14096 Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen]
14097 Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen]
14100 Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen]
14098 An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen]
14099 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen]
14101 Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen]