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Full Idea
According to the Standard Conception of Metaphysical Necessity, P is metaphysically necessary when it holds in every possible world in which the laws of metaphysics (about the form or structure of the actual world) hold
Gist of Idea
Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds
Source
Gideon Rosen (The Limits of Contingency [2006], 10)
Book Ref
'Identity and Modality', ed/tr. MacBride,Fraser [OUP 2006], p.38
A Reaction
Rosen has a second meaning, in Idea 18856. He thinks it is crucial to see that there are two senses, because many things come out as metaphysically necessary on one concept, but contingent on the other. Interesting....
Related Ideas
Idea 18856 Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
Idea 18858 Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
| 18849 | Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen] |
| 18850 | 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen] |
| 18848 | Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen] |
| 18851 | Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen] |
| 18852 | A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen] |
| 18853 | A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen] |
| 18854 | The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen] |
| 18855 | Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen] |
| 18858 | Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen] |
| 18857 | Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen] |
| 18856 | Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen] |