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Full Idea
What possible reason could one have for thinking of some propositions that they need to be grounded in what there is that doesn't apply to all propositions?
Gist of Idea
Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are?
Source
Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec')
Book Ref
'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [CUP 2008], p.107
A Reaction
Well, if truthmaking said that all truths are grounded, then some could be grounded in what there is, and others in how it is, or maybe even how it isn't (if you get a decent account of negative truths).
| 17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
| 18509 | Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true [Heil] |
| 18473 | 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride] |
| 18481 | Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride] |
| 18868 | Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron] |
| 18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
| 17962 | The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest] |
| 18333 | Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami] |
| 18866 | Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant] |