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Single Idea 18868
[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
]
Full Idea
What possible reason could one have for thinking of some propositions that they need to be grounded in what there is that doesn't apply to all propositions?
Gist of Idea
Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are?
Source
Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec')
Book Ref
'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [CUP 2008], p.107
A Reaction
Well, if truthmaking said that all truths are grounded, then some could be grounded in what there is, and others in how it is, or maybe even how it isn't (if you get a decent account of negative truths).
The
31 ideas
from Ross P. Cameron
15401
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Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings
[Cameron]
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15393
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An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently
[Cameron]
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15396
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Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one
[Cameron]
|
15394
|
Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths
[Cameron]
|
15395
|
Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths?
[Cameron]
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15102
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S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one)
[Cameron]
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15103
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Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent
[Cameron]
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15104
|
The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically
[Cameron]
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18881
|
For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world
[Cameron]
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18879
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What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker
[Cameron]
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18880
|
Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc
[Cameron]
|
18868
|
Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are?
[Cameron]
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18867
|
Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth
[Cameron]
|
18873
|
God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists
[Cameron]
|
18871
|
I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers
[Cameron]
|
18870
|
Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable
[Cameron]
|
18869
|
Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded
[Cameron]
|
18872
|
We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds
[Cameron]
|
18877
|
Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things
[Cameron]
|
18875
|
Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true
[Cameron]
|
18878
|
Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features
[Cameron]
|
18874
|
Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers
[Cameron]
|
18923
|
The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature
[Cameron]
|
18924
|
Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property
[Cameron]
|
18930
|
Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange'
[Cameron]
|
18927
|
Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended?
[Cameron]
|
18926
|
One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths
[Cameron]
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18929
|
We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist!
[Cameron]
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18928
|
If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have
[Cameron]
|
18932
|
The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation
[Cameron]
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18931
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Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate
[Cameron]
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