more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
I tend to think that the fundamental reason we can have the correspondence theory of truth is that truthmaker theory is correct.
Gist of Idea
I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers
Source
Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec')
Book Ref
'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [CUP 2008], p.108
A Reaction
[This responds to Fumerton 2006, who gives the opposite view] Cameron gives himself the classic problem of spelling out the correspondence relation (perhaps as 'congruence'). I like truthmaking, but I'm unsure about correspondence.
| 18349 | All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Wittgenstein, by Rami] |
| 10846 | Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one [Lewis] |
| 18354 | Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David] |
| 18356 | Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David] |
| 18363 | Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David] |
| 14390 | Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks] |
| 18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
| 18871 | I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron] |
| 18870 | Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron] |
| 18338 | Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami] |
| 12463 | Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs] |