more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 18876
[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
]
Full Idea
I think that we should consider Berkeley as believing in trees; we should simply claim that he has false beliefs about what trees are.
Gist of Idea
Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are
Source
report of George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710]) by Ross P. Cameron - Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology 'Realism'
Book Ref
'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [CUP 2008], p.118
A Reaction
I can be realist about spots before my eyes, or a ringing in my ears, but be (quite sensibly) unsure about what they are, so Cameron's suggestion sounds plausible.
The
33 ideas
from 'The Principles of Human Knowledge'
18876
|
Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are
[Berkeley, by Cameron]
|
6495
|
Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism
[Robinson,H on Berkeley]
|
23636
|
Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds
[Reid on Berkeley]
|
6491
|
Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought
[Berkeley, by Robinson,H]
|
6720
|
Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations
[Berkeley]
|
6721
|
Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self
[Berkeley]
|
6722
|
Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit
[Berkeley]
|
6723
|
The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds
[Berkeley]
|
6724
|
The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives
[Berkeley]
|
6726
|
No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities
[Berkeley]
|
6727
|
Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold
[Berkeley]
|
6728
|
Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion
[Berkeley]
|
6729
|
Material substance is just general existence which can have properties
[Berkeley]
|
6730
|
We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections
[Berkeley]
|
6731
|
No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy
[Berkeley]
|
6732
|
When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind
[Berkeley]
|
6733
|
I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind
[Berkeley]
|
6714
|
Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars
[Berkeley]
|
6711
|
The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects
[Berkeley]
|
22309
|
An idea can only be like another idea
[Berkeley]
|
6734
|
If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature
[Berkeley]
|
6735
|
All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move
[Berkeley]
|
6736
|
I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects
[Berkeley]
|
6737
|
Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings
[Berkeley]
|
10581
|
I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas
[Berkeley]
|
15861
|
The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience
[Berkeley]
|
6713
|
If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason
[Berkeley]
|
6715
|
Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars
[Berkeley]
|
6716
|
Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas
[Berkeley]
|
6717
|
Abstract ideas are impossible
[Berkeley]
|
6718
|
I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought
[Berkeley]
|
6719
|
No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas
[Berkeley]
|
16636
|
A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents
[Berkeley]
|