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Full Idea
Moral realism isn't realism about things, and it seems strange to suggest that moral realism is existence entailing in the way that realism about unobservable is.
Gist of Idea
Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things
Source
Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism')
Book Ref
'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [CUP 2008], p.121
A Reaction
Cameron is questioning whether a realist has to believe in truthmakers. It seems to me that his doubts are because he insists that truthmaking is committed to the existence of 'things'. I assume any moral realism must supervene on nature.
Related Idea
Idea 17282 Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K]
| 10910 | The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 10847 | Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis] |
| 10911 | Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 18470 | Maybe truth-making is an unanalysable primitive, but we can specify principles for it [Smith,B] |
| 18351 | Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe] |
| 18362 | Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David] |
| 14415 | A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks] |
| 18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
| 17325 | Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins] |
| 18877 | Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron] |
| 18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |