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Single Idea 18877

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation ]

Full Idea

Moral realism isn't realism about things, and it seems strange to suggest that moral realism is existence entailing in the way that realism about unobservable is.

Gist of Idea

Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things

Source

Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism')

Book Ref

'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [CUP 2008], p.121


A Reaction

Cameron is questioning whether a realist has to believe in truthmakers. It seems to me that his doubts are because he insists that truthmaking is committed to the existence of 'things'. I assume any moral realism must supervene on nature.

Related Idea

Idea 17282 Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K]


The 14 ideas from 'Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology'

What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron]
Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron]
For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron]
Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron]
I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron]
Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron]
Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron]
Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron]
God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron]
We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron]
Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron]
Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron]
Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron]
Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron]