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Full Idea
All that is necessary for realism, I claim, is that truth is grounded in mind-independent features of fundamental reality. Truthmaker theory comes into play because it is a theory about what those features are (…so it isn't a commitment to realism).
Gist of Idea
Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features
Source
Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism')
Book Ref
'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [CUP 2008], p.122
A Reaction
[He cites Michael Devitt for this approach] What is the word 'fundamental' doing here? Because the mind-dependent parts of reality are considered non-fundamental? The no-true-Scotsman-hates-whisky move? His truthmaking is committed to 'things'.
Related Ideas
Idea 18875 Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron]
Idea 18467 Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong]
Idea 18881 For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron]
| 18879 | What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron] |
| 18880 | Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron] |
| 18881 | For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron] |
| 18869 | Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron] |
| 18871 | I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron] |
| 18870 | Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron] |
| 18868 | Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron] |
| 18867 | Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron] |
| 18873 | God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron] |
| 18872 | We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron] |
| 18877 | Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron] |
| 18874 | Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron] |
| 18875 | Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron] |
| 18878 | Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron] |