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Single Idea 18891

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds ]

Full Idea

There seems to be nothing in the theory of direct reference to block the anti-essentialist assertion that the substance water might have been the very same entity and yet have had a different chemical structure.

Gist of Idea

Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different

Source

Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence (1st edn) [1981], 6.23.1)

Book Ref

Salmon,Nathan: 'Reference and Essence (2nd ed)' [Prometheus 2005], p.186


A Reaction

Indeed, water could be continuously changing its inner structure, while retaining the surface appearance that gets baptised as 'water'. We make the reasonable empirical assumption, though, that structure-change implies surface-change.


The 6 ideas from 'Reference and Essence (1st edn)'

Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N]
The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N]
S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson]
Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N]
Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N]
Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N]