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Single Idea 18901

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths ]

Full Idea

A fact is an existential characteristic 'of' the domain; it is not something 'in' the domain. To search for truth-making facts in the world is indeed futile.

Gist of Idea

Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain

Source

Fred Sommers (Intellectual Autobiography [2005], 'Existence')

Book Ref

'The Old New Logic', ed/tr. Oderberg,David S. [MIT 2005], p.19


A Reaction

Attacking Austin on truth. Helpful. It is hard to see how a physical object has a mysterious power to 'make' a truth. No energy-transfer seems involved in the making. Animals think true thoughts; I suspect that concerns their mental maps of the world.

Related Ideas

Idea 10835 True sentences says the appropriate descriptive thing on the appropriate demonstrative occasion [Austin,JL]

Idea 18902 Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson]


The 21 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about what determines truths]:

The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that [Aristotle]
Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell]
Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers]
We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J]
Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis]
Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K]
Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David]
Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride]
What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron]
Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron]
Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron]
The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant]
If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen]
There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen]