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Single Idea 18903

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not ]

Full Idea

If there is one idea that is the keystone of the edifice that constitutes Sommers's united philosophy it is that terms are the linguistic entities subject to negation in the most basic sense. It is a very old idea, tending to be rejected in modern times.

Gist of Idea

Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms

Source

report of Fred Sommers (Intellectual Autobiography [2005]) by George Engelbretsen - Trees, Terms and Truth 2

Book Ref

'The Old New Logic', ed/tr. Oderberg,David S. [MIT 2005], p.26


A Reaction

Negation in modern logic is an operator applied to sentences, typically writing '¬Fa', which denies that F is predicated of a, with Fa being an atomic sentence. Do we say 'not(Stan is happy)', or 'not-Stan is happy', or 'Stan is not-happy'? Third one?

Related Ideas

Idea 18896 Aristotle places terms at opposite ends, joined by a quantified copula [Aristotle, by Sommers]

Idea 18904 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]

Idea 11214 We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]

Idea 18906 Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen]


The 13 ideas with the same theme [role of 'not' in systems of logic]:

The contradictory of a contradictory is an affirmation [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard]
Negation of negation doubles back into a self-relationship [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell]
Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation [Wittgenstein on Russell]
We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein]
'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p [Wittgenstein]
Negation doesn't arise from reasoning, but from deep instincts [Cioran]
Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
Classical negation is circular, if it relies on knowing negation-conditions from truth-conditions [Dummett]
Natural language 'not' doesn't apply to sentences [Dummett]
'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride]
Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen]