more on this theme     |     more from this thinker


Single Idea 18903

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not ]

Full Idea

If there is one idea that is the keystone of the edifice that constitutes Sommers's united philosophy it is that terms are the linguistic entities subject to negation in the most basic sense. It is a very old idea, tending to be rejected in modern times.

Gist of Idea

Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms

Source

report of Fred Sommers (Intellectual Autobiography [2005]) by George Engelbretsen - Trees, Terms and Truth 2

Book Ref

'The Old New Logic', ed/tr. Oderberg,David S. [MIT 2005], p.26


A Reaction

Negation in modern logic is an operator applied to sentences, typically writing '¬Fa', which denies that F is predicated of a, with Fa being an atomic sentence. Do we say 'not(Stan is happy)', or 'not-Stan is happy', or 'Stan is not-happy'? Third one?

Related Ideas

Idea 18896 Aristotle places terms at opposite ends, joined by a quantified copula [Aristotle, by Sommers]

Idea 18904 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]

Idea 11214 We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]

Idea 18906 Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen]


The 9 ideas from 'Intellectual Autobiography'

'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers]
Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers]
Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers]
Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers]
Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers]
In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers]
Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers]