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Full Idea
There is a crucial distinction in term logic between affirming a negated predicate term of some subject and denying the unnegated version of that term of that same subject. We must distinguish 'X is non-P' from 'X is not P'.
Gist of Idea
Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different
Source
George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 2)
Book Ref
'The Old New Logic', ed/tr. Oderberg,David S. [MIT 2005], p.32
A Reaction
The first one affirms something about X, but the second one just blocks off a possible description of X. 'X is non-harmful' and 'X is not harmful' - if X had ceased to exist, the second would be appropriate and the first wouldn't? I'm guessing.
Related Ideas
Idea 18903 Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
Idea 18904 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
| 18913 | Traditional term logic struggled to express relations [Engelbretsen] |
| 18907 | Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen] |
| 18905 | Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen] |
| 18906 | Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen] |
| 18908 | Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen] |
| 18912 | Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen] |
| 18917 | Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen] |
| 18916 | Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen] |
| 18915 | If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen] |
| 18919 | There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen] |
| 18918 | Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen] |
| 18920 | 'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen] |
| 18921 | Individuals are arranged in inclusion categories that match our semantics [Engelbretsen] |
| 18922 | Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen] |