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Single Idea 18908

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not ]

Full Idea

Standard logic recognises only one kind of negation: sentential negation. Consequently, negation of a general term/predicate always amounts to negation of the entire sentence.

Gist of Idea

Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates

Source

George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 3)

Book Ref

'The Old New Logic', ed/tr. Oderberg,David S. [MIT 2005], p.33

Related Idea

Idea 18907 Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen]


The 13 ideas with the same theme [role of 'not' in systems of logic]:

The contradictory of a contradictory is an affirmation [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard]
Negation of negation doubles back into a self-relationship [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell]
Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation [Wittgenstein on Russell]
We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein]
'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p [Wittgenstein]
Negation doesn't arise from reasoning, but from deep instincts [Cioran]
Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
Classical negation is circular, if it relies on knowing negation-conditions from truth-conditions [Dummett]
Natural language 'not' doesn't apply to sentences [Dummett]
'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride]
Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen]