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Single Idea 18917

[filed under theme 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence ]

Full Idea

Existence and nonexistence are not primarily properties of individual objects (dogs, unicorns), but of totalities. To say that some object exists is just to say that it is a constituent of the world, which is a characteristic of the world, not the object.

Gist of Idea

Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects

Source

George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 4)

Book Ref

'The Old New Logic', ed/tr. Oderberg,David S. [MIT 2005], p.43


A Reaction

This has important implications for the problem of truthmakers for negative existential statements (like 'there are no unicorns'). It is obviously a relative of Armstrong's totality facts that do the job. Not sure about 'a characteristic of'.

Related Ideas

Idea 18916 Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen]

Idea 14394 It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks]

Idea 18377 Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong]


The 14 ideas from 'Trees, Terms and Truth'

Traditional term logic struggled to express relations [Engelbretsen]
Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen]
Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen]
Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen]
Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen]
Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen]
Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen]
Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen]
If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen]
There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen]
Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen]
'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen]
Individuals are arranged in inclusion categories that match our semantics [Engelbretsen]
Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen]