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Full Idea
I reject saying there must be an additional truthmaker for 'Determinately, p': rather, I say that the truthmaker for p must simply be a determinate existent rather than a mere existent.
Gist of Idea
Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate
Source
Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 6)
Book Ref
'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Vol.6', ed/tr. Zimmerman,D/Bennett,K [OUP 2011], p.82
A Reaction
As he puts it (quite persuasively), God doesn't need to add an extra truthmaker for a determinate truth. Cameron rejects Necessitarianism. He uses 'determinate' fairly uncritically. What makes the truth of the truthmaker's determinacy?
Related Idea
Idea 18928 If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
| 18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
| 18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
| 18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
| 18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |
| 18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
| 18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
| 18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
| 18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
| 18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |