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Single Idea 18932

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths ]

Full Idea

The orthodox truthmaker theorist thinks the facts concerning the existence of the truthmakers do not admit of further explanation.

Gist of Idea

The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation

Source

Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 6)

Book Ref

'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Vol.6', ed/tr. Zimmerman,D/Bennett,K [OUP 2011], p.85


A Reaction

It is fairly obvious, I suppose, that not every truth can have a truthmaker, just as the verification principle could not be verified, and you can't perceive your perception in order to check it. Could God withdraw the power of truthmaking?


The 21 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about what determines truths]:

The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that [Aristotle]
Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell]
Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers]
We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J]
Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis]
Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K]
Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David]
Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride]
What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron]
Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron]
Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron]
The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant]
If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen]
There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen]