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Single Idea 18934

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names ]

Full Idea

Some empty names sentences can be understood, so appear to be meaningful ('Pegasus was sired by Poseidon'), ...some appear to be co-referential ('Santa Claus'/'Father Christmas'), and some appear to be straightforwardly true ('Pegasus doesn't exist').

Gist of Idea

Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true

Source

Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 1)

Book Ref

'Routledge Companion to Phil of Language', ed/tr. Russell/Graff Faria [Routledge 2015], p.153


A Reaction

Hang on to this, when the logicians arrive and start telling you that your talk of empty names is vacuous, because there is no object in the 'domain' to which a predicate can be attached. Meaning, reference and truth are the issues around empty names.


The 13 ideas with the same theme [name whose object does not exist]:

If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer]
It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege]
In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege]
Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell]
Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell]
A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell]
An expression is only a name if it succeeds in referring to a real object [Bostock]
It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury]
'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo]
Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni]
Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer]
Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer]