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Single Idea 18942
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
]
Full Idea
Russell's view of names, understood as a definite description, which is understood as a quantificational phrase, is not to contribute an object to propositions, but to contribute a complex of properties.
Gist of Idea
Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object
Source
report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 3
Book Ref
'Routledge Companion to Phil of Language', ed/tr. Russell/Graff Faria [Routledge 2015], p.155
A Reaction
This seems to contradict the role of constants in first-logic, which are the paradigm names, picking out an object in the domain. Kripke says names and definite descriptions have different modal profiles.
Related Ideas
Idea 18941
Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer]
Idea 10453
In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach]
The
33 ideas
with the same theme
[names imply information about the object]:
14075
|
Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense
[Frege, by Gibbard]
|
10424
|
A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept
[Frege, by Sainsbury]
|
18773
|
People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander'
[Frege]
|
8448
|
Any object can have many different names, each with a distinct sense
[Frege]
|
10999
|
Names need a means of reidentifying their referents
[Bradley, by Read]
|
10450
|
Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions
[Russell, by Bach]
|
14457
|
Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that'
[Russell]
|
14458
|
Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description
[Russell]
|
18941
|
Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions
[Russell, by Sawyer]
|
4945
|
Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise
[Russell, by Kripke]
|
18942
|
Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object
[Russell, by Sawyer]
|
7745
|
Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names?
[McCullogh on Russell]
|
7744
|
Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions
[Russell, by McCullogh]
|
5386
|
Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind
[Russell]
|
4946
|
A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family
[Wittgenstein, by Kripke]
|
10925
|
Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential
[Quine]
|
9182
|
Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated
[Dummett]
|
21889
|
'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description
[Derrida]
|
21878
|
Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name
[Derrida]
|
9175
|
We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid
[Kripke]
|
4951
|
A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular
[Kripke]
|
17031
|
A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions
[Kripke]
|
7746
|
We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them)
[Searle]
|
7747
|
How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense?
[Searle]
|
7748
|
'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"'
[Searle]
|
7749
|
Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions
[Searle]
|
7750
|
Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way
[Searle]
|
5829
|
We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false
[Schwartz,SP]
|
5830
|
The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct
[Schwartz,SP]
|
10452
|
Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses
[Bach]
|
15599
|
Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same
[Fine,K]
|
16216
|
Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity
[Hawley]
|
9455
|
Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category
[Bealer]
|