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Single Idea 1895
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
]
Full Idea
The majority say causes are immediate (when they are directly proportional to effects), or associate (making an equal contribution to effects), or cooperant (making a slight contribution).
Gist of Idea
Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly
Source
Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.15)
Book Ref
Sextus Empiricus: 'Outlines of Pyrrhonism', ed/tr. Bury,R.G. [Prometheus 1990], p.191
The
19 ideas
with the same theme
[analysis of situation that leads to an event]:
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588
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We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise
[Aristotle]
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1895
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Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly
[Sext.Empiricus]
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2272
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There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect
[Descartes]
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17254
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An effect needs a sufficient and necessary cause
[Hobbes]
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8382
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For Hume a constant conjunction is both necessary and sufficient for causation
[Hume, by Crane]
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8345
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A cause is the total of all the conditions which inevitably produce the result
[Mill]
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8369
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Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon
[Ducasse]
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8373
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When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage
[Ducasse]
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8360
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We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts
[Wright,GHv]
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8350
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Since Mill causation has usually been explained by necessary and sufficient conditions
[Anscombe]
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8343
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Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events
[Kim on Mackie]
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8385
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A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect
[Mackie, by Crane]
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8335
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Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals
[Mackie]
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8336
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The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known
[Mackie]
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8346
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Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity
[Davidson]
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15217
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Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity
[Harré/Madden]
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8330
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Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both?
[Sosa/Tooley]
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8407
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A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it
[Sanford]
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4211
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Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case
[Lowe]
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