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Single Idea 18981

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique ]

Full Idea

'Substance' appears now only as another name for the fact that phenomena as they come are actually grouped and given in coherent forms.

Gist of Idea

'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience

Source

William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 4)

Book Ref

James,William: 'Pragmatism - eight lectures' [Dover 1995], p.57


A Reaction

This is the strongly empirical strain in James's empiricism. This sounds like a David Lewis comment on the Humean mosaic of experience. We Aristotelians at least believe that the groups run much deeper than the surface of experience.


The 20 ideas with the same theme [objections to the very concept of substances]:

Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes]
Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau]
We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does [Locke]
If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C]
A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley]
The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities [Hume]
Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them [Hume]
The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant]
'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience [James]
An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell]
We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]
The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]
We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden]
Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil]
Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg]
A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C]
When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C]
Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C]
A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C]
For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau]