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Single Idea 18994
[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
]
Full Idea
Assertive content - what a sentence is heard as saying - can be at quite a distance from compositional content.
Gist of Idea
The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content
Source
Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], Intro)
Book Ref
Yablo,Stephen: 'Aboutness' [Princeton 2014], p.5
A Reaction
This is the obvious reason why semantics cannot be entirely compositional, since there is nearly always a contextual component which then has to be added. In the case of irony, the compositional content is entirely reversed.
The
33 ideas
from Stephen Yablo
18992
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Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them
[Yablo]
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18994
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The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content
[Yablo]
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18993
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If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter
[Yablo]
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18996
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A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts
[Yablo]
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18997
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Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal
[Yablo]
|
18999
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y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them
[Yablo]
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18998
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Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have
[Yablo]
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19001
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'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker
[Yablo]
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19002
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A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true
[Yablo]
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19003
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Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit
[Yablo]
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19004
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Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true
[Yablo]
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19005
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Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A
[Yablo]
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19006
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An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption
[Yablo]
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19007
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A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects
[Yablo]
|
10577
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Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential
[Yablo]
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10578
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We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori
[Yablo]
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10579
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Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier
[Yablo]
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10580
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Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths
[Yablo]
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8858
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Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties
[Yablo]
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8859
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The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae
[Yablo]
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8862
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Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors
[Yablo]
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8861
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Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential
[Yablo]
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8864
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We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer
[Yablo]
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8863
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We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets
[Yablo]
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8865
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If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise?
[Yablo]
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10805
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A sentence should be recarved to reveal its content or implication relations
[Yablo]
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19493
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Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world
[Yablo]
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19494
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Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts
[Yablo]
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14381
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A statue is essentially the statue, but its lump is not essentially a statue, so statue isn't lump
[Yablo, by Rocca]
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19489
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For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value
[Yablo]
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19490
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Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures
[Yablo]
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19491
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'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds'
[Yablo]
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9138
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An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference
[Yablo, by Sorensen]
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