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Single Idea 18999
[filed under theme 4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
]
Full Idea
The principle of Supplementation says that y is properly part of x, only if a z exists that 'makes up the difference' between them. [note: that is, z is disjoint from y and sums with y to form x]
Gist of Idea
y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them
Source
Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 03.2)
Book Ref
Yablo,Stephen: 'Aboutness' [Princeton 2014], p.47
The
14 ideas
from 'Aboutness'
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18993
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If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter
[Yablo]
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18992
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Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them
[Yablo]
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18994
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The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content
[Yablo]
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18996
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A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts
[Yablo]
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18997
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Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal
[Yablo]
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18999
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y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them
[Yablo]
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18998
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Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have
[Yablo]
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19001
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'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker
[Yablo]
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19002
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A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true
[Yablo]
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19003
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Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit
[Yablo]
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19004
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Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true
[Yablo]
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19005
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Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A
[Yablo]
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19006
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An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption
[Yablo]
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19007
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A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects
[Yablo]
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