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Single Idea 19001

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names ]

Full Idea

'Pegasus does not exist' has a paradoxical, self-undermining flavour. On the one hand, the empty name makes it untrue. But now, why is the name empty? Because Pegasus does not exist. 'Pegasus does not exist' is untrue because Pegasus does not exist.

Gist of Idea

'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker

Source

Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 05.7 n20)

Book Ref

Yablo,Stephen: 'Aboutness' [Princeton 2014], p.87


A Reaction

Beautiful! This is Yablo's reward for continuing to ask 'why?' after everyone else has stopped in bewilderment at the tricky phenomenon.


The 13 ideas with the same theme [name whose object does not exist]:

If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer]
It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege]
In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege]
Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell]
Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell]
A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell]
An expression is only a name if it succeeds in referring to a real object [Bostock]
It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury]
'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo]
Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni]
Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer]
Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer]