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Full Idea
We know from Gettier that if you are right to regard Q as true, but you are sufficiently confused about HOW it is true - about how things stand with respect to its subject matter - then you don't know that Q.
Gist of Idea
Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true
Source
Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 07.4)
Book Ref
Yablo,Stephen: 'Aboutness' [Princeton 2014], p.119
A Reaction
I'm inclined to approach Gettier by focusing on the propositions being expressed, where his cases tend to focus on the literal wording of the sentences. What did the utterer mean by the sentences - not what did they appear to say.
| 6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
| 5430 | A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell] |
| 5429 | True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell] |
| 8886 | Being a true justified belief is not a sufficient condition for knowledge [Gettier] |
| 20225 | For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap [Zagzebski] |
| 20226 | Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked [Zagzebski] |
| 20228 | We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth [Zagzebski] |
| 20227 | Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck [Zagzebski] |
| 19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo] |
| 19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
| 19728 | Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts [Black,T] |
| 19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
| 19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |