more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 19004
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
]
Full Idea
We know from Gettier that if you are right to regard Q as true, but you are sufficiently confused about HOW it is true - about how things stand with respect to its subject matter - then you don't know that Q.
Gist of Idea
Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true
Source
Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 07.4)
Book Ref
Yablo,Stephen: 'Aboutness' [Princeton 2014], p.119
A Reaction
I'm inclined to approach Gettier by focusing on the propositions being expressed, where his cases tend to focus on the literal wording of the sentences. What did the utterer mean by the sentences - not what did they appear to say.
The
33 ideas
from Stephen Yablo
18992
|
Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them
[Yablo]
|
18994
|
The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content
[Yablo]
|
18993
|
If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter
[Yablo]
|
18996
|
A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts
[Yablo]
|
18997
|
Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal
[Yablo]
|
18999
|
y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them
[Yablo]
|
18998
|
Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have
[Yablo]
|
19001
|
'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker
[Yablo]
|
19002
|
A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true
[Yablo]
|
19003
|
Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit
[Yablo]
|
19004
|
Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true
[Yablo]
|
19005
|
Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A
[Yablo]
|
19006
|
An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption
[Yablo]
|
19007
|
A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects
[Yablo]
|
10577
|
Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential
[Yablo]
|
10578
|
We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori
[Yablo]
|
10579
|
Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier
[Yablo]
|
10580
|
Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths
[Yablo]
|
8858
|
Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties
[Yablo]
|
8859
|
The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae
[Yablo]
|
8862
|
Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors
[Yablo]
|
8861
|
Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential
[Yablo]
|
8864
|
We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer
[Yablo]
|
8863
|
We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets
[Yablo]
|
8865
|
If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise?
[Yablo]
|
10805
|
A sentence should be recarved to reveal its content or implication relations
[Yablo]
|
19493
|
Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world
[Yablo]
|
19494
|
Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts
[Yablo]
|
14381
|
A statue is essentially the statue, but its lump is not essentially a statue, so statue isn't lump
[Yablo, by Rocca]
|
19489
|
For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value
[Yablo]
|
19490
|
Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures
[Yablo]
|
19491
|
'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds'
[Yablo]
|
9138
|
An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference
[Yablo, by Sorensen]
|