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Full Idea
If possible worlds are sets of propositions, we need some way to distinguish those sets of propositions that do from those that do not correspond to genuine possibilities.
Gist of Idea
If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible?
Source
Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.2)
Book Ref
Vetter,Barbara: 'Potentiality: from Dispositions to Modality' [OUP 2015], p.6
A Reaction
The idea of a 'genuine' possibility does not seem to play a role in the conceptual scheme of those who treat possibility entirely in terms of possible worlds. If possibility is primitive, or is a set of worlds, there can be no criterion for 'genuine'.
| 7690 | If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis] |
| 14673 | You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N] |
| 15794 | If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan] |
| 7695 | Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette] |
| 7694 | We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette] |
| 10981 | A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read] |
| 19011 | If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible? [Vetter] |