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Single Idea 19017

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent ]

Full Idea

Nomological dispositions such as electric charge seem different from ordinary dispositions. A particle's being electrically charged is not just a possibility of exerting a certain force. Rather, the particle has to exert a force in certain circumstances.

Gist of Idea

Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised

Source

Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 2.7)

Book Ref

Vetter,Barbara: 'Potentiality: from Dispositions to Modality' [OUP 2015], p.61


A Reaction

I can only pull when there is something to pull, but a magnet seems to have a 'field' of attraction which is pullish in character. Does it detect something to pull (like a monad)? Can there be a force which has no object?

Related Idea

Idea 13174 A piece of flint contains something resembling perceptions and appetites [Leibniz]


The 11 ideas with the same theme [dispositions only exist when behaviour occurs]:

The Megarans say something is only capable of something when it is actually doing it [Aristotle]
Megaran actualism is just scepticism about the qualities of things [Aristotle]
Megaran actualists prevent anything from happening, by denying a capacity for it to happen! [Aristotle]
Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin]
We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine]
Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them [Quine, by Martin,CB]
What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden]
There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts [Sidelle]
Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird]
If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry]
Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised [Vetter]