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Single Idea 19017

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent ]

Full Idea

Nomological dispositions such as electric charge seem different from ordinary dispositions. A particle's being electrically charged is not just a possibility of exerting a certain force. Rather, the particle has to exert a force in certain circumstances.

Gist of Idea

Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised

Source

Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 2.7)

Book Ref

Vetter,Barbara: 'Potentiality: from Dispositions to Modality' [OUP 2015], p.61

A Reaction

I can only pull when there is something to pull, but a magnet seems to have a 'field' of attraction which is pullish in character. Does it detect something to pull (like a monad)? Can there be a force which has no object?

Related Idea

Idea 13174 A piece of flint contains something resembling perceptions and appetites [Leibniz]

The 34 ideas from 'Potentiality'

23705 A potentiality may not be a disposition, but dispositions are strong potentialities [Vetter, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
19009 Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it [Vetter]
19010 All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects [Vetter]
19008 The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification [Vetter]
19012 The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality [Vetter]
19011 If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible? [Vetter]
19013 Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer [Vetter]
19014 How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms? [Vetter]
19015 Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational') [Vetter]
19016 We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....' [Vetter]
19017 Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised [Vetter]
19018 Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances [Vetter]
19019 Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties [Vetter]
19020 Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics [Vetter]
19022 Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing) [Vetter]
19021 I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability [Vetter]
19023 Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies [Vetter]
19024 A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class [Vetter]
19025 Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions' [Vetter]
19026 If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different? [Vetter]
19027 Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials [Vetter]
19028 Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location [Vetter]
19030 Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important? [Vetter]
19029 It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p [Vetter]
19031 There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'. [Vetter]
19032 S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds [Vetter]
19033 Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates [Vetter]
19034 The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts [Vetter]
19036 The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible [Vetter]
19037 Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce? [Vetter]
19039 The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism [Vetter]
19038 Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ [Vetter]
19041 Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions [Vetter]
19040 We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality [Vetter]