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Single Idea 19022
[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
]
Full Idea
Water has no potentiality to break. But water has a potentiality to be frozen and turn into ice, which does have a potentiality to break. So water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break.
Gist of Idea
Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing)
Source
Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 4.6)
Book Ref
Vetter,Barbara: 'Potentiality: from Dispositions to Modality' [OUP 2015], p.136
A Reaction
Thus potentially has an 'iterated' character to it, and an appropriate modal logic for it will have to allow for those iterations. She suggests a version of System T modal logic.
Related Idea
Idea 19021
I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability [Vetter]
The
34 ideas
from 'Potentiality'
23705
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A potentiality may not be a disposition, but dispositions are strong potentialities
[Vetter, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
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19009
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Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it
[Vetter]
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19010
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All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects
[Vetter]
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19008
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The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification
[Vetter]
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19011
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If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible?
[Vetter]
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19012
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The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality
[Vetter]
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19013
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Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer
[Vetter]
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19015
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Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational')
[Vetter]
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19014
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How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms?
[Vetter]
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19016
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We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....'
[Vetter]
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19017
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Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised
[Vetter]
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19018
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Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances
[Vetter]
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19019
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Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties
[Vetter]
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19020
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Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics
[Vetter]
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19021
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I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability
[Vetter]
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19022
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Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing)
[Vetter]
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19023
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Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies
[Vetter]
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19024
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A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class
[Vetter]
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19025
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Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions'
[Vetter]
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19026
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If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different?
[Vetter]
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19027
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Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials
[Vetter]
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19028
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Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location
[Vetter]
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19029
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It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p
[Vetter]
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19030
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Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important?
[Vetter]
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19031
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There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'.
[Vetter]
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19032
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S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds
[Vetter]
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19033
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Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates
[Vetter]
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19034
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The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts
[Vetter]
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19036
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The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible
[Vetter]
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19037
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Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce?
[Vetter]
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19039
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The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism
[Vetter]
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19038
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Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ
[Vetter]
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19041
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Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions
[Vetter]
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19040
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We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality
[Vetter]
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