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Single Idea 19032
[filed under theme 4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
]
Full Idea
Wedgwood (2007:220) argues that S5 is undesirable because it excludes that necessary truths may have contingent grounds.
Gist of Idea
S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds
Source
Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 6.4 n5)
Book Ref
Vetter,Barbara: 'Potentiality: from Dispositions to Modality' [OUP 2015], p.213
A Reaction
Cameron defends the possibility of necessity grounded in contingency, against Blackburn's denial of it. It's interesting that we choose the logic on the basis of the metaphysics. Shouldn't there be internal reasons for a logic's correctness?
Related Ideas
Idea 14529
If something underlies a necessity, is that underlying thing necessary or contingent? [Blackburn, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
Idea 15103
Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron]
The
43 ideas
from Barbara Vetter
17993
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Laws are relations of kinds, quantities and qualities, supervening on the essences of a domain
[Vetter]
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17953
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Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates
[Vetter]
|
17952
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Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity
[Vetter]
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17954
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Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)?
[Vetter]
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17955
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Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility
[Vetter]
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17956
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Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects
[Vetter]
|
17958
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The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible
[Vetter]
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17957
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Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality
[Vetter]
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17959
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Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued
[Vetter]
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23705
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A potentiality may not be a disposition, but dispositions are strong potentialities
[Vetter, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
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19009
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Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it
[Vetter]
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19010
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All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects
[Vetter]
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19008
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The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification
[Vetter]
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19012
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The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality
[Vetter]
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19011
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If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible?
[Vetter]
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19013
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Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer
[Vetter]
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19014
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How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms?
[Vetter]
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19015
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Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational')
[Vetter]
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19016
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We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....'
[Vetter]
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19017
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Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised
[Vetter]
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19018
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Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances
[Vetter]
|
19019
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Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties
[Vetter]
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19020
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Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics
[Vetter]
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19022
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Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing)
[Vetter]
|
19021
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I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability
[Vetter]
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19023
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Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies
[Vetter]
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19024
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A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class
[Vetter]
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19025
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Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions'
[Vetter]
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19026
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If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different?
[Vetter]
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19027
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Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials
[Vetter]
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19028
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Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location
[Vetter]
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19029
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It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p
[Vetter]
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19030
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Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important?
[Vetter]
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19031
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There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'.
[Vetter]
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19032
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S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds
[Vetter]
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19033
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Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates
[Vetter]
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19034
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The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts
[Vetter]
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19036
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The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible
[Vetter]
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19037
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Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce?
[Vetter]
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19039
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The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism
[Vetter]
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19038
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Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ
[Vetter]
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19041
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Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions
[Vetter]
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19040
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We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality
[Vetter]
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