more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 19050

[filed under theme 19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique ]

Full Idea

Holism blurs the supposed contrast beween the synthetic sentence, with its empirical content, and the analytic sentence, with its null content.

Gist of Idea

Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences

Source

Willard Quine (Five Milestones of Empiricism [1975], p.71)

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'Theories and Things' [Harvard 1981], p.71


A Reaction

This spells out nicely that Quine's rejection of the distinction is completely tied to his holistic view of language. The obvious phenomenon of compositionality (building sentence meaning in steps) counts against holism.

Related Idea

Idea 19049 In scientific theories sentences are too brief to be independent vehicles of empirical meaning [Quine]


The 17 ideas with the same theme [rejection of sharp distinction between real and verbal assertion]:

Concepts are only analytic once the predicate is absorbed into the subject [Schleiermacher]
When we explicate the category of being, we watch a new category emerge [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way [Katz on Frege]
Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences [Quine]
In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine]
I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage [Quine]
Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian]
Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson]
The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine]
Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins]
Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine]
If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]
The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine]
If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical? [Rey]
The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K]
Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider]