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Single Idea 19055

[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions ]

Full Idea

An ability to state the condition for the truth of a sentence is, in effect, no more than an ability to express the content of the sentence in other words.

Gist of Idea

Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence

Source

Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.224)

Book Ref

Dummett,Michael: 'Truth and Other Enigmas' [Duckworth 1978], p.224


A Reaction

Alternatively, if you give something other than a paraphrase of the sentence as its meaning (such as a proof of its truth), then you seem to have departed from your target sentence. Can we reduce and eliminate our sentences in this way?


The 5 ideas from 'The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic'

Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher]
Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett]
Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett]
If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett]
Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett]