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Single Idea 19062
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
]
Full Idea
The standard two-valued semantics for classical logic involves a conception under which to grasp the meaning of a sentence is to apprehend the conditions under which it is, or is not, true.
Gist of Idea
Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions
Source
Michael Dummett (The Justification of Deduction [1973], p.305)
Book Ref
Dummett,Michael: 'Truth and Other Enigmas' [Duckworth 1978], p.305
A Reaction
The idea is that you only have to grasp the truth tables for sentential logic, and that needs nothing more than knowing whether a sentence is true or false. I'm not sure where the 'conditions' creep in, though.
The
23 ideas
with the same theme
[logic when interpreted, rather than mere formal systems]:
13335
|
Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth
[Tarski]
|
13336
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A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language
[Tarski]
|
18756
|
Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions
[Tarski, by McGee]
|
19313
|
Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth
[Tarski, by Kirkham]
|
19059
|
In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1
[Dummett]
|
19062
|
Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions
[Dummett]
|
19063
|
Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established
[Dummett]
|
3810
|
In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax
[Searle]
|
13364
|
Interpretation by assigning objects to names, or assigning them to variables first
[Bostock, by PG]
|
10284
|
There are three different standard presentations of semantics
[Hodges,W]
|
10283
|
A formula needs an 'interpretation' of its constants, and a 'valuation' of its variables
[Hodges,W]
|
10285
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I |= φ means that the formula φ is true in the interpretation I
[Hodges,W]
|
10016
|
When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense'
[Hodes]
|
10570
|
Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience
[Fine,K]
|
23539
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Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences
[Fine,K]
|
6653
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Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth
[Lowe]
|
10898
|
The semantics shows how truth values depend on instantiations of properties and relations
[Zalabardo]
|
10902
|
We can do semantics by looking at given propositions, or by building new ones
[Zalabardo]
|
13697
|
Valuations in PC assign truth values to formulas relative to variable assignments
[Sider]
|
18792
|
Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations
[Mares]
|
18753
|
An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets
[McGee]
|
23447
|
In classical semantics singular terms refer, and quantifiers range over domains
[Linnebo]
|
15349
|
It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F)
[Horsten]
|