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Full Idea
The standard two-valued semantics for classical logic involves a conception under which to grasp the meaning of a sentence is to apprehend the conditions under which it is, or is not, true.
Gist of Idea
Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions
Source
Michael Dummett (The Justification of Deduction [1973], p.305)
Book Ref
Dummett,Michael: 'Truth and Other Enigmas' [Duckworth 1978], p.305
A Reaction
The idea is that you only have to grasp the truth tables for sentential logic, and that needs nothing more than knowing whether a sentence is true or false. I'm not sure where the 'conditions' creep in, though.
11066 | Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna] |
19058 | Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett] |
19059 | In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett] |
19060 | Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett] |
19061 | An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett] |
19062 | Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett] |
19063 | Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett] |
19064 | Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett] |
19065 | Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett] |
19066 | Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett] |
19067 | A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett] |