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Full Idea
For the coherence theory of truth, the truth conditions of propositions consist in other propositions. The correspondence theory, in contrast, states that the truth conditions of propositions are ... objective features of the world.
Gist of Idea
Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)?
Source
James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], Intro)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.1
A Reaction
It is obviously rather important for your truth-conditions theory of meaning that you are clear about your theory of truth. A correspondence theory is evidently taken for granted, even in possible worlds versions.
| 19075 | Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO] |
| 19074 | Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO] |
| 19076 | Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO] |
| 19077 | Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO] |
| 19078 | Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO] |
| 19079 | For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO] |
| 19082 | Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO] |
| 19084 | Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO] |
| 19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |