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Full Idea
Unlike deflationary theories, the coherence and correspondence theories both hold that truth is a property of propositions that can be analyzed in terms of the sorts of truth-conditions propositions have, and the relation propositions stand in to them.
Gist of Idea
Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions
Source
James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], Intro)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.1
A Reaction
This is presumably because deflationary theories reject the external relations of a proposition as a feature of its truth. This evidently leaves them in need of a theory of meaning, which may be fairly minimal. Horwich would be an example.
| 19075 | Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO] |
| 19074 | Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO] |
| 19076 | Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO] |
| 19077 | Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO] |
| 19078 | Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO] |
| 19079 | For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO] |
| 19082 | Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO] |
| 19084 | Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO] |
| 19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |