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Single Idea 1909
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
]
Full Idea
If Epicurus makes the end consist in pleasure and asserts that the soul, like all else, is composed of atoms, it is impossible to explain how in a heap of atoms there can come about pleasure, or judgement of the good.
Gist of Idea
How can pleasure or judgement occur in a heap of atoms?
Source
comment on Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism III.187
Book Ref
Sextus Empiricus: 'Outlines of Pyrrhonism', ed/tr. Bury,R.G. [Prometheus 1990], p.252
A Reaction
This is a nice statement of the mind-body problem. Ontologically, physics still seems to present reality as a 'heap of particles', which gives no basis for the emergence of anything as strange as consciousness. But then magnetism is pretty strange.
The
14 ideas
with the same theme
[attempts to prove that mind is not just physical]:
1909
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How can pleasure or judgement occur in a heap of atoms?
[Sext.Empiricus on Epicurus]
|
5885
|
Souls contain no properties of elements, and elements contain no properties of souls
[Cicero]
|
5951
|
If atoms have no qualities, they cannot possibly produce a mind
[Plutarch]
|
6229
|
Sense is fixed in the material form, and so can't grasp abstract universals
[Cudworth]
|
6382
|
The 'grain problem' says physical objects are granular, where sensations appear not to be
[Sellars, by Polger]
|
5796
|
If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings
[Searle]
|
2308
|
Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies
[Kim]
|
3002
|
If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought?
[Fodor]
|
6122
|
No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences
[Mellor/Crane]
|
3150
|
Can identity explain reason, free will, non-extension, intentionality, subjectivity, experience?
[Rey]
|
3129
|
Physicalism offers something called "complexity" instead of mental substance
[Rey]
|
4072
|
The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind
[Crane]
|
4598
|
Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them
[Heil]
|
3448
|
Do new ideas increase the weight of the brain?
[Dance]
|