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Single Idea 19095
[filed under theme 3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
]
Full Idea
In Peirce's naturalist view of truth, it is a catch-all for the particular local aims of enquiry - empirical adequacy, predictive power, coherence, simplicity, elegance, explanatory power, a reliable guide to action, fruitfulness, great understanding.
Gist of Idea
Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry
Source
report of Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]) by Cheryl Misak - Pragmatism and Deflationism 1
Book Ref
'New Pragmatists', ed/tr. Misak,Cheryl [OUP 2009], p.70
A Reaction
The aims I cited in my thesis on explanation. One given, for me, is that truth is an ideal, which may or may not be attainable, to varying degrees. It is just what thinking aims at. I suspect, though, that these listed items have one thing in common.
The
24 ideas
with the same theme
[truth as the aim of enquiry]:
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19571
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Delusion and truth differ in their life functions
[Novalis]
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7661
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Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators
[Peirce]
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15335
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Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us?
[Horsten on Peirce]
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14796
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Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry
[Peirce]
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19246
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'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory
[Peirce]
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19095
|
Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry
[Peirce, by Misak]
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19097
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Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful
[Peirce, by Misak]
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21494
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If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely?
[Atkin on Peirce]
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22305
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If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true
[James]
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18984
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True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise)
[James]
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7616
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Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability
[Putnam]
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8828
|
Truth is rational acceptability
[Putnam]
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2549
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For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality
[Rorty]
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22665
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Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature
[Nozick]
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3884
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The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth
[Scruton]
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6627
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Radical pragmatists abandon the notion of truth
[Stich, by Lowe]
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19086
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Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible?
[Macbeth]
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15336
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The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B
[Horsten]
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19094
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For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible
[Misak]
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19100
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Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling
[Misak]
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19099
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'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence...
[Misak]
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19103
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'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it
[Misak]
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19105
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Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries
[Misak]
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19108
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Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards
[Misak]
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