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Single Idea 19105
[filed under theme 3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
]
Full Idea
If truth is what satisfies our aims in first-order assertion and inquiry (as the pragmatist says), then there is no search for an elusive property, or a metaphysical property, or a property which we cannot grasp.
Gist of Idea
Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries
Source
Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 3)
Book Ref
'New Pragmatists', ed/tr. Misak,Cheryl [OUP 2009], p.79
A Reaction
This pragmatic approach is much more persuasive than the usual caricature of pragmatic truth (Idea 19097), but I'm beginning to wonder how you distinguish an 'inquiry' (or 'assertion') from other modes of thought. Do I smell a circularity?
Related Idea
Idea 19097
Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak]
The
24 ideas
with the same theme
[truth as the aim of enquiry]:
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19571
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Delusion and truth differ in their life functions
[Novalis]
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7661
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Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators
[Peirce]
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15335
|
Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us?
[Horsten on Peirce]
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14796
|
Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry
[Peirce]
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19246
|
'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory
[Peirce]
|
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19095
|
Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry
[Peirce, by Misak]
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19097
|
Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful
[Peirce, by Misak]
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21494
|
If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely?
[Atkin on Peirce]
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22305
|
If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true
[James]
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18984
|
True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise)
[James]
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7616
|
Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability
[Putnam]
|
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8828
|
Truth is rational acceptability
[Putnam]
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2549
|
For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality
[Rorty]
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22665
|
Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature
[Nozick]
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3884
|
The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth
[Scruton]
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6627
|
Radical pragmatists abandon the notion of truth
[Stich, by Lowe]
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19086
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Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible?
[Macbeth]
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15336
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The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B
[Horsten]
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19094
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For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible
[Misak]
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19099
|
'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence...
[Misak]
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19100
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Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling
[Misak]
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19103
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'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it
[Misak]
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19105
|
Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries
[Misak]
|
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19108
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Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards
[Misak]
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