more on this theme | more from this text
Full Idea
Getting from a Tarskian definition of truth to a substantive account of the semantic properties of the object language may involve as little as the reintroduction of a primitive notion of truth.
Gist of Idea
We can get a substantive account of Tarski's truth by adding primitive 'true' to the object language
Source
John Etchemendy (Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence [1988], p.60), quoted by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 1
Book Ref
Davidson,Donald: 'Truth and Predication' [Belknap Harvard 2005], p.24
A Reaction
This is, I think, the first stage in modern developments of axiomatic truth theories. The first problem would be to make sure you haven't reintroduced the Liar Paradox. You need axioms to give behaviour to the 'true' predicate.
14181 | Validity is where either the situation or the interpretation blocks true premises and false conclusion [Etchemendy, by Read] |
14180 | Etchemendy says fix the situation and vary the interpretation, or fix interpretations with varying situations [Etchemendy, by Read] |
19137 | We can get a substantive account of Tarski's truth by adding primitive 'true' to the object language [Etchemendy] |
19323 | 'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy] |