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Single Idea 19142

[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability ]

Full Idea

Kolmogorov's axiomatisation of probability puts clear constraints on the concept of probability, but leaves open whether probability is further characterised as relative frequency, degree of belief, or something else.

Gist of Idea

Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature

Source

Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2)

Book Ref

Davidson,Donald: 'Truth and Predication' [Belknap Harvard 2005], p.32


A Reaction

Davidson cites this to show the limitations of axiomatic approaches to any topic (e.g. sets, truth, arithmetic). The item in question must be treated as a 'primitive'. This always has the feeling of second-best.


The 15 ideas with the same theme [asserting the degree of likelihood of a fact]:

We transfer the frequency of past observations to our future predictions [Hume]
Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson]
The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman]
High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman]
Probability is statistical (behaviour of chance devices) or epistemological (belief based on evidence) [Hacking]
Probability was fully explained between 1654 and 1812 [Hacking]
Epistemological probability based either on logical implications or coherent judgments [Hacking]
A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% [Edgington]
Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments [Edgington]
Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington]
Subjective probability measures personal beliefs; objective probability measures the chance of an event happening [Bird]
Objective probability of tails measures the bias of the coin, not our beliefs about it [Bird]
Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross]
In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross]
Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG]