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Single Idea 19144

[filed under theme 3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth ]

Full Idea

The 'epistemic' view of truth asserts an essential tie to epistemology, and introduces a dependence of truth on what can somehow be verified by finite rational creatures.

Gist of Idea

'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify

Source

Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2)

Book Ref

Davidson,Donald: 'Truth and Predication' [Belknap Harvard 2005], p.33

A Reaction

This view, which seems to be widely held, strikes me as an elementary confusion. I take truth to be fully successful belief. If you say belief can never be fully successful, then we can't know the truth - but that doesn't destroy the concept of truth.

The 32 ideas from 'Truth and Predication'

19131 We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson]
19133 If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson]
19132 Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson]
19136 Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson]
19139 Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson]
19147 Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson]
19140 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson]
19151 Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson]
19144 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson]
19148 There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson]
19150 Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson]
19145 We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson]
19146 Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson]
19142 Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson]
19149 If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson]
19152 Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson]
19154 The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson]
19153 Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson]
19156 Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson]
19158 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson]
19161 We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson]
19162 Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson]
19163 You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson]
19160 A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson]
19166 The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson]
19167 Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson]
19174 Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson]
19170 Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson]
19173 Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson]
19176 The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson]
19172 To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson]
19169 Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson]