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Single Idea 19145

[filed under theme 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth ]

Full Idea

Truth is easily defined in terms of satisfaction (as Tarski showed), but, alternatively, satisfaction can be taken to be whatever relation yields a correct account of truth.

Gist of Idea

We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth

Source

Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2)

Book Ref

Davidson,Donald: 'Truth and Predication' [Belknap Harvard 2005], p.34

A Reaction

Davidson is assessing which is the prior 'primitive' concept, and he votes for truth. A perennial problem in philosophy, and very hard to find reasons for a preference. The axiomatic approach grows from taking truth as primitive. Axioms for satisfaction?

Related Ideas

Idea 19146 Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson]

Idea 19147 Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson]

The 18 ideas with the same theme ['satisfaction' as a means of defining truth]:

14454 An argument 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true [Russell]
19184 The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski]
19191 Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski]
15410 Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski]
18811 Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt]
15365 We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten]
19314 For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham]
19316 Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham]
19175 Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson]
19145 We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson]
19146 Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson]
19174 Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson]
10817 Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H]
19318 A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham]
19319 If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham]
13504 Truth for sentences is satisfaction of formulae; for sentences, either all sequences satisfy it (true) or none do [Hart,WD]
13634 Satisfaction is 'truth in a model', which is a model of 'truth' [Shapiro]
19128 If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]