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Single Idea 19145
[filed under theme 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
]
Full Idea
Truth is easily defined in terms of satisfaction (as Tarski showed), but, alternatively, satisfaction can be taken to be whatever relation yields a correct account of truth.
Gist of Idea
We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth
Source
Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2)
Book Ref
Davidson,Donald: 'Truth and Predication' [Belknap Harvard 2005], p.34
A Reaction
Davidson is assessing which is the prior 'primitive' concept, and he votes for truth. A perennial problem in philosophy, and very hard to find reasons for a preference. The axiomatic approach grows from taking truth as primitive. Axioms for satisfaction?
Related Ideas
Idea 19146
Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson]
Idea 19147
Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson]
The
159 ideas
from Donald Davidson
7949
|
Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it
[Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
|
20020
|
If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action
[Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
|
20072
|
We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention
[Davidson, by Stout,R]
|
20075
|
Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons
[Davidson, by Stout,R]
|
3395
|
Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
23734
|
The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal
[Davidson, by Smith,M]
|
23737
|
Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them
[Smith,M on Davidson]
|
6664
|
Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons
[Davidson, by Lowe]
|
20045
|
Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate
[Davidson]
|
10371
|
Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions
[Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
|
8403
|
Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events
[Field,H on Davidson]
|
4778
|
A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law
[Davidson, by Psillos]
|
8346
|
Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity
[Davidson]
|
8347
|
Explanations typically relate statements, not events
[Davidson]
|
8348
|
If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk
[Davidson]
|
8349
|
The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk
[Davidson]
|
19081
|
Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds
[Davidson, by Donnellan]
|
8255
|
Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally
[McDowell on Davidson]
|
18703
|
Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right'
[Davidson, by Button]
|
8252
|
Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons
[Davidson, by McDowell]
|
8801
|
Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs
[Davidson]
|
8802
|
Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them
[Davidson]
|
8804
|
Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence
[Davidson]
|
8805
|
Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects
[Davidson]
|
8806
|
The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality
[Davidson]
|
19044
|
Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true
[Davidson]
|
6398
|
Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background
[Davidson]
|
6399
|
Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes
[Davidson]
|
6400
|
Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism
[Davidson]
|
7331
|
A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic
[Davidson, by Macey]
|
8872
|
It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority
[Davidson]
|
8873
|
The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant?
[Davidson]
|
8874
|
It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content
[Davidson]
|
23294
|
It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge
[Davidson]
|
23295
|
Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler
[Davidson]
|
23296
|
We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts
[Davidson]
|
23297
|
The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite
[Davidson]
|
23298
|
Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory
[Davidson]
|
19698
|
Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed
[Davidson, by Neta]
|
9843
|
You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first
[Dummett on Davidson]
|
18914
|
Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events
[Davidson, by Engelbretsen]
|
8278
|
The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular
[Lowe on Davidson]
|
14602
|
Events can only be individuated causally
[Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
|
14004
|
We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs
[Davidson, by Bourne]
|
20024
|
Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive
[Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
|
20076
|
An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable
[Davidson]
|
6383
|
Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate
[Davidson]
|
6384
|
The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will
[Davidson]
|
6385
|
The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best
[Davidson]
|
6175
|
External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn
[Davidson, by Rowlands]
|
7771
|
We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events
[Davidson, by Lycan]
|
15002
|
If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events
[Davidson, by Sider]
|
8860
|
Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events
[Yablo on Davidson]
|
6386
|
In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences
[Davidson]
|
3429
|
Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
6620
|
Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation
[Davidson, by Lowe]
|
2307
|
Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
5497
|
Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative
[Davidson, by Lycan]
|
4081
|
Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties
[Davidson, by Crane]
|
2321
|
If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible?
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
3404
|
Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
3529
|
Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't
[Davidson, by Maslin]
|
3405
|
If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
3524
|
Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events
[Davidson, by Maslin]
|
3526
|
Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described
[Davidson, by Maslin]
|
16041
|
Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical
[Davidson]
|
4983
|
There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene
[Davidson]
|
7775
|
Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules
[Davidson]
|
7776
|
Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean
[Davidson]
|
7777
|
We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false
[Davidson]
|
4041
|
Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain
[Davidson]
|
4042
|
Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time
[Davidson]
|
3960
|
There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties
[Davidson]
|
3961
|
Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events
[Davidson]
|
3965
|
Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world
[Davidson]
|
3966
|
The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism
[Davidson]
|
3964
|
If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible
[Davidson]
|
3963
|
There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events
[Davidson]
|
3962
|
Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws
[Davidson]
|
3967
|
Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought
[Davidson]
|
3968
|
Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them
[Davidson]
|
3969
|
There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard
[Davidson]
|
3972
|
Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean
[Davidson]
|
3970
|
Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others
[Davidson]
|
3971
|
There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do
[Davidson]
|
3973
|
Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless
[Davidson]
|
3974
|
Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant
[Davidson]
|
20074
|
We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions
[Davidson, by Stout,R]
|
6387
|
A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth
[Davidson]
|
6388
|
Is reference the key place where language and the world meet?
[Davidson]
|
6389
|
To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically
[Davidson]
|
6390
|
With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language
[Davidson]
|
6391
|
A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible
[Davidson]
|
18702
|
Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling
[Davidson]
|
15160
|
Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead
[Davidson, by Soames]
|
14612
|
Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic
[Davidson, by Smart]
|
18902
|
Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to
[Davidson]
|
6394
|
The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning
[Davidson]
|
6395
|
An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use
[Davidson]
|
11144
|
Concepts are only possible in a language community
[Davidson]
|
11145
|
Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken
[Davidson]
|
6396
|
A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief
[Davidson]
|
6397
|
The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community
[Davidson]
|
6392
|
Thought depends on speech
[Davidson]
|
6393
|
A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech
[Davidson]
|
10346
|
Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world
[Davidson, by Dummett]
|
10347
|
Objectivity is intersubjectivity
[Davidson]
|
8866
|
If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me
[Davidson]
|
8867
|
A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality
[Davidson]
|
8868
|
Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication
[Davidson]
|
8869
|
The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers
[Davidson]
|
8870
|
Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds
[Davidson]
|
8188
|
Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences
[Davidson, by Dummett]
|
6179
|
Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around?
[Blackburn on Davidson]
|
7327
|
Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning
[Davidson, by Miller,A]
|
7772
|
Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature
[Davidson, by Lycan]
|
7769
|
You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time
[Davidson, by Lycan]
|
7332
|
There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form
[Davidson]
|
19132
|
Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage
[Davidson]
|
19133
|
If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole
[Davidson]
|
19131
|
We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts
[Davidson]
|
19136
|
Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning
[Davidson]
|
19139
|
Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common
[Davidson]
|
19147
|
Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language
[Davidson]
|
19150
|
Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief
[Davidson]
|
19148
|
There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to
[Davidson]
|
19145
|
We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth
[Davidson]
|
19146
|
Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference?
[Davidson]
|
19144
|
'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify
[Davidson]
|
19140
|
'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference
[Davidson]
|
19151
|
Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard
[Davidson]
|
19142
|
Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature
[Davidson]
|
19149
|
If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations'
[Davidson]
|
19152
|
Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker
[Davidson]
|
19154
|
The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants
[Davidson]
|
19153
|
Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler
[Davidson]
|
19156
|
Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places
[Davidson]
|
19158
|
'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human'
[Davidson]
|
19162
|
Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed
[Davidson]
|
19161
|
We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth
[Davidson]
|
19163
|
You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it
[Davidson]
|
19166
|
The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence
[Davidson]
|
19167
|
Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing
[Davidson]
|
19160
|
A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication
[Davidson]
|
19170
|
Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote
[Davidson]
|
19172
|
To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language
[Davidson]
|
19174
|
Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths
[Davidson]
|
19169
|
Predicates are a source of generality in sentences
[Davidson]
|
19176
|
The concept of truth can explain predication
[Davidson]
|
19173
|
Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help
[Davidson]
|
23287
|
Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language
[Davidson]
|
23288
|
When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept?
[Davidson]
|
23289
|
Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding
[Davidson]
|
23290
|
It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions
[Davidson]
|
23291
|
Without truth, both language and thought are impossible
[Davidson]
|
23292
|
Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world
[Davidson]
|
23284
|
Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true
[Davidson]
|
23285
|
If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves)
[Davidson]
|
23286
|
Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it
[Davidson]
|